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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Samantha Cook appealed the district court’s order denying her motion to suppress and
motion to reconsider. She argued that the district court erred by denying her motions because (1)
the officer did not have reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop and (2) traffic law at issue was
void for vagueness. The State responded, and this Reply Brief responds to some, but not all, of
the State’s arguments.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were articulated in Mr. Cook’s
Appellant’s Brief. (App. Br., pp.1–5.) They are not repeated here, but are incorporated by
reference.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Cook’s motion to suppress and motion to
reconsider?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Cook’s Motion To Suppress And Motion To
Reconsider
Ms. Cook set forth multiple arguments challenging the district court’s denial of her
motion to suppress and motion to reconsider. First, she argued that the police officer, Deputy
Jacobsen, did not have reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop once he saw a properly displayed
temporary permit in Ms. Cook’s rear windshield. (App. Br., pp.8–10.) To this end, she submitted
that the Court of Appeals’ interpretation in State v. Kinch, 159 Idaho 96 (Ct. App. 2015), of the
traffic law at issue, I.C. § 49-432(4), was inconsistent with the statute’s plain language. (App.
Br., pp.10–15.) Applying the plain language, Ms. Cook contended that she complied with the
statute. (App. Br., p.15.) If this Court was not inclined to overrule or reject Kinch, Ms. Cook
maintained, in the alternative, that she still complied with I.C. § 49-432(4). (App. Br., pp.15–17.)
Either way, Ms. Cook asserted that Deputy Jacobsen no longer had authority for the seizure once
he saw the properly displayed permit, so the evidence obtained during the traffic stop must be
suppressed. (App. Br., pp.17–19.) Finally, Ms. Cook argued, again in the alternative, that
I.C. § 49-432(4) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to her conduct. (App. Br., pp.19–22.)
In response to Ms. Cook’s statutory interpretation argument, the State contends that
Ms. Cook ignored the plain language of I.C. § 49-432(4) as a whole. (Resp. Br., pp.11–12.) The
State points to the phrase “shall be displayed at all times” to assert that the temporary permit
must be “readily legible” from the vantage point of another vehicle on the highway because “it
would be impossible to read the permit from a closer vantage point while the vehicle is in motion
on the highway.” (Resp. Br., pp.11–12.) Impossibility and absurdity, however, have no bearing
on the plain language interpretation of a statute. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151
Idaho 889, 896 (2011) (holding that the appellate courts lack the authority to revise or void an
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unambiguous statute that is “patently absurd” or would “produce absurd results”). The plain
language of I.C. § 49-432(4) says nothing about another driver’s ability to read a temporary
permit on another vehicle while driving on the highway. It states that the temporary permit “shall
be displayed at all times while the vehicle is being operated on the highways by posting the
permit upon the windshield of each vehicle or in another prominent place, where it may be
readily legible.” I.C. § 49-432(4) (emphasis added). The “display” requirement means just that—
the driver must display (e.g., exhibit, present, show) his permit on the windshield or other
acceptable location. Put another way, the driver cannot leave his temporary permit in the
glovebox while driving on the highway. The State’s plain language argument, similar to the
Court of Appeals’ holding in Kinch, reads additional language into I.C. § 49-432(4). If the Idaho
legislature intended to require more than “display,” such as visibility from a certain distance, the
legislature must add that language to the statute.
The State also contends that Ms. Cook did not preserve her argument that the traffic stop
was unlawful once Deputy Jacobsen saw the properly displayed permit. (Resp. Br., p.14.) This is
not accurate. In her motion to suppress, Ms. Cook argued that she was “illegally seized by law
enforcement . . . , which led to an unreasonable, warrantless search of [her] and her property.”
(R., p.54.) She argued in her memorandum in support:
In Ms. Cook’s case, the temporary registration can be clearly seen in the rear
window of Ms. Cook’s vehicle; in fact, the deputy appears to shine his flashlight
almost directly on it at the time of the stop. The presumption of validity, not of
invalidity exists in this case, and the mere existence of Ms. Cook’s properly
placed temporary permit does not serve as the basis for reasonable suspicion to
allow Deputy Jacobson to stop her vehicle to inspect that permit unless the
invalidity of the permit, such as by improper alteration, was obvious and
discernible by the deputy prior to the stop of Ms. Cook. If the Court were to allow
this to exist as a proper reason for a stop, it would be contrary to the holding in
Salois that specifically articulates police should not have unfettered discretion to
stop each and every vehicle being operated with a temporary registration simply
to investigate its validity. Further, Salois held that an officer must have a
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reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before a traffic stop is initiated, not
after—this is goes back to the first argument in Ms. Cook’s case that the deputy
did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop her for her tires
crossing the fog line.
(R., pp.79–80 (emphasis added).) At the suppression hearing, she argued:
As soon as [Deputy Jacobsen] saw the permit with the spotlight, that issue should
have been done. . . . . And so with that, I believe that any evidence seized after
this, with the contact of the deputy with my client, are the fruits of an unlawful
search and an – excuse me, unlawful seizure and unlawful search and it should be
suppressed.
(Tr. Vol. I,1 p.46, L.17–p.47, L.6 (emphasis added).) Ms. Cook’s briefing and oral argument
clearly assert that, once Deputy Jacobsen saw the properly displayed permit, he no longer had
any lawful basis for the traffic stop, and any subsequent seizure or search premised upon that
basis was a Fourth Amendment violation. Ms. Cook made the same argument in her Appellant’s
Brief:

3.

Once Deputy Jacobsen Saw Ms. Cook’s Properly Displayed Permit, He
No Longer Had Authority For The Seizure Because His Reasonable
Suspicion Was Dispelled

. . . Because Kinch does not control and Ms. Cook complied with the statute,
Deputy Jacobsen no longer had a lawful basis to continue the traffic stop once he
saw the properly displayed permit in Ms. Cook’s rear window.
This outcome is dictated by State v. Salois, 144 Idaho 344 (Ct. App.
2007). . . .
Here, the presence of Ms. Cook’s properly displayed temporary permit
dispelled Deputy Jacobsen’s reasonable suspicion for an invalid or absent
registration. . . . Once Deputy Jacobsen shined his flashlight on Ms. Cook’s rear
window just prior to initiating contact with her, Deputy Jacobsen no longer had
authority for the seizure.
1

There are four transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the motion to
suppress hearing and the district court’s oral ruling. The second, cited as Volume II, contains the
hearing on Ms. Cook’s motion for reconsideration. The third, cited as Volume III, contains the
entry of plea hearing. Finally, the fourth transcript, cited as Volume IV, contains the sentencing
hearing.
5

(App. Br., pp.17, 18.) In support of this appellate argument, Ms. Cook relied on Salois, as relied
on by trial counsel below, (R., pp.79, 80; Tr. Vol. I, p.45, Ls.4–18, p.45, L.25–p.46, L.8), but she
also referenced Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), and State v. Linze, 161 Idaho
605 (2016). These references to Rodriguez and Linze are not an attempt to submit a new
argument on appeal. They are simply recent citations of well-established precedent: an officer
cannot pursue traffic stop once he lacks reasonable suspicion; the seizure must end. These
principles are not in dispute, and Ms. Cook submitted no new argument by relying on them. She
merely referred to these cases, along with Salois, for the proposition that Deputy Jacobsen lacked
reasonable suspicion once he saw the temporary permit. The prolonged seizure of Ms. Cook and
the subsequent search of her vehicle were both unlawful because Deputy Jacobsen had no
reasonable suspicion to continue the seizure. By continuing to detain and question Ms. Cook
without any grounds to do so, Deputy Jacobsen unlawfully extended the traffic stop without
reasonable suspicion. The fruits of the unlawful seizure therefore must be suppressed.
Finally, the State argues that Deputy Jacobsen could lawfully continue the traffic stop
once he saw the properly displayed permit. (Resp. Br., pp.15–17.) In other words, the State
asserts that Deputy Jacobsen could make contact with Ms. Cook and conduct ordinary inquires,
such as requesting her license and registration. (Resp. Br., pp.15–17.) This conduct, however,
was expressly prohibited by this Court in Linze and the U.S. Supreme Court in Rodriguez.
Certainly, an officer can conduct inquires incident to a traffic stop, such as “checking the driver’s
license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the
automobile’s registration and proof of insurance,” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615, but these
related checks must be done during the traffic stop.
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Like a Terry2 stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop
context is determined by the seizure’s “mission”—to address the traffic violation
that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns. Because addressing
the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may “last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate th[at] purpose.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality
opinion). Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic
infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.
Id. at 1614 (citations omitted). Likewise, this Court wrote in Linze:
[T]he United States Supreme Court did not restrict its analysis to cases in which
the underlying purpose of the traffic stop was completed prior to a drug dog
sweep. Instead, the United States Supreme Court reached a much broader holding:
“a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop
was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.”
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. This rule is both broad and inflexible. It applies to
all extensions of traffic stops including those that could reasonably be considered
de minimis.
161 Idaho at 608. As established by this case law, once an officer has fulfilled the traffic stop’s
purpose, he cannot go on a fishing expedition for unrelated traffic infractions or other crimes.
The officer has lost authority for the seizure when tasks tied to that particular traffic infraction
are completed. As such, Deputy Jacobsen could not conduct these ordinary traffic stop inquiries
once he saw the properly displayed permit. His authority for the seizure was terminated. Deputy
Jacobsen should have informed Ms. Cook that he initially stopped her for driving without a
temporary permit, but now he has seen the permit, so she is free to go.3 This would not cause any

2

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
To note, the State recites in its facts that, after Deputy Jacobsen contacted Ms. Cook, he (1)
observed her to be unusually nervous and (2) detected the odor of marijuana. (Resp. Br., p.1
(citing R., pp.10–12).) These facts come from Deputy Jacobsen’s probable cause affidavit.
(R., pp.10–12.) The suppression hearing, however, contains no evidence on Deputy Jacobsen’s
marijuana odor detection. Deputy Jacobsen’s testimony described only his observations leading
up to his contact with Ms. Cook. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.6, L.16–p.24, L.15.) He did not testify
regarding his interaction with her or his subsequent search. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.6, L.16–p.24, L.15.)
Thus, there is no testimony on precisely when Deputy Jacobsen detected the marijuana odor.
(About minute 13:45 on Deputy Jacobsen’s dash cam video, he asks Ms. Cook about marijuana
use due to his purported detection of a marijuana odor when he was at her passenger window.
But, again, there is nothing in the dash cam video to show if Deputy Jacobsen detected the odor
right away or a couple of minutes into the seizure.) Similarly, the district court made no factual
3
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“bizarre and confusing” interactions with the police, as suggested by the State. (Resp. Br., p.17.)
It would cause lawful, constitutional ones. And Ms. Cook would submit that the State’s position
would actually cause the bizarre and confusing interactions. A driver would likely believe she is
“being needlessly harassed by the police,” (Resp. Br., p.17), if a police officer continued to seize
and investigate her without any grounds to do so. For example, if a police officer thought a
driver committed a traffic infraction, but realized his mistake upon approaching the vehicle, the
driver would certainly be left “confused and bewildered” if the officer questioned the driver
about her license, registration, and insurance, her ownership of the vehicle, whether she
consumed any alcohol, her phone number, where she was coming from, where she was going,
her address, whether she was a student or employed, if she had any weapons or drugs in the car,
and if she was on probation. (See State’s Ex. 1, 1:26–3:57.) These fishing expeditions are
impermissible. Deputy Jacobsen exceeded his lawful authority of the traffic stop by seizing
Ms. Cook after he saw the properly displayed permit. All evidence obtained from the unlawful
seizure must be suppressed.
For all other issues, Ms. Cook respectfully refers this Court to her Appellant’s Brief.

findings on when Deputy Jacobsen detected the marijuana odor. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.51, L.14–p.60,
L.6.) As such, if the marijuana odor is new, separate basis to continue Ms. Cook’s seizure, the
State failed to present any evidence at the suppression hearing to support this basis and therefore
did not meet its burden. See State v. Case, 159 Idaho 546, 552 (Ct. App. 2015) (refusing to
affirm the district court’s order denying the defendant's motion to suppress on the State’s
alternative theory because the factual record for that theory was not developed below). At best, if
this Court determines that Deputy Jacobsen lacked reasonable suspicion once he saw the
temporary permit, but regained reasonable suspicion once he detected the odor of marijuana, this
case should be remanded to the district court for further factual findings on the timing of the
marijuana odor detection and, specifically, if Deputy Jacobsen detected the marijuana odor
before or after he no longer had authority for the traffic stop.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Cook respectfully requests that this Court reverse or vacate the district court’s order
denying her motion to suppress or its order denying her motion to reconsider, vacate the order
withholding judgment, and remand her case for further proceedings.
DATED this 29th day of March, 2018.

__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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